Maximum weakly stable matchings in graphs without odd preference cycles

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Let (G,<) be a preference system with ties where in every odd cycle there is a node that prefers its clockwise neighbour to its other neighbour, and there is another node that prefers its anti-clockwise neighbour to its other neighbour. How well can we approximate the maximum size weakly stable matching?


Remarks

Clearly, the maximum stable marriage problem is a special case, for which the best known approximation ratio is 3/2 by McDermid [1] (see also [2] and [3]). On the other hand, the preference system is guaranteed to have a weakly stable matching since there are no odd preference cycles, and, as Irving and Manlove [4] showed, the size of the maximum weakly stable matching is at most twice the size of the minimum weakly stable matching, which immediately gives a 2-approximation algorithm (find a stable matching for an arbitrary break of ties).

The approximation ratio as a function of tie lengths is also interesting. For the maximum stable marriage problem, Koenemann, Pashkovich and Tofigzade [5] gave a (3L−2)/(2L−1)-approximation algorithm, where L is the longest tie in a preference list.

References

  1. E. McDermid, A 3/2-Approximation Algorithm for General Stable Marriage, Proc. ICALP2009, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 5555 (2009), 689-700. DOI link. Author link.
  2. Z. Király, Linear time local approximation algorithm for maximum stable marriage, Algorithms 6(3), 471–484 (2013). DOI link
  3. K. Paluch, Faster and simpler approximation of stable matchings, Algorithms 7(2), 189–202 (2014). DOI link
  4. R. W. Irving, D. F. Manlove, The stable roommates problem with ties, Journal of Algorithms 43 (2002), 85-105. DOI link. Author link.
  5. J. Koenemann, K. Pashkovich, N. Tofigzade, Approximating Stable Matchings with Ties of Bounded Size, International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (2020), arXiv link